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ACTUAL EXISTENCE, IDENTITY AND ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY
ABSTRACT. The paper first distinguishes ontological priority from epistemological
priority and unilateral ontic dependence. Then explications of ontological priority are
offered in terms of the reducibility of the actual existence or identity of entities in one
ontological category to the actual existence or identity of entities in another. These expli-
cations lead to incompatible orders of ontological priority for individuals, properties of
individuals and states of affairs. Common to those orders is, however, that the primacy
of the category of individuals is abandoned. This primacy is challenged in the paper also
by epistemological arguments, and an onto-anthropological explanation is offered for the
very common but false idea that individuals are ontological prior to all other kinds of
entities. Finally ontological priority is discussed with respect to a fully specified system of
ontological categories.
In medieval times it was a familiar philosophical idiom that one entity is
prior to or precedes another entity. This, of course, did not normally mean
– in philosophical discourse – that an entity is (or exists) in a temporal
sense before another, but it did include a judgment of value: the entity
which was prior to another entity was in a sense also more valuable than
the latter, although this judgment of value surely did not constitute the
central meaning of the phrase “ is prior to ”. Today we prefer to say that
one entity is more fundamental or more basic than another. Note that the
valuative aspects of meaning have disappeared from the modern expres-
sion. For brevity’s sake, I will here use “ is prior to ” instead of “ is a
more fundamental entity than ”.
As in medieval times, there still are two ways of understanding “ is
prior to ”: it may be understood as “ is epistemologically (in ordine
cognoscendi) prior to ”, or as “ is ontologically (in ordine essendi) prior
to ”. The two orders of priority can differ radically in their ranking of
entities. For example, to later medieval philosophers, for whom God was
still indisputably first in the order of being, God was nevertheless last in the
order of (our) cognition. I will concentrate in this paper on an elucidation
of the relation of ontological priority, keeping in mind that ontological
priority cannot be entirely separated from broadly epistemological issues.
After all, in analyzing the relation of ontological priority we have to use
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concepts, our concepts, the concepts that are available to us, and in making
judgments of ontological priority we are judging according to our lights,
according to how instances of ontological priority appear to us. We have
no cognitive grasp of the relation of ontological priority as it would be
without our cognitive grasp of it.
In clarifying the relation of ontological priority there are many ques-
tions that have to be answered, foremost the question whether there is
indeed the relation of ontological priority. Are there not several relations
of ontological priority? There immediately appear to be at least two such
relations. According to relation 1 of ontological priority, it is in each in-
stance a personal affair, as it were, between two entities. According to
relation 2 of ontological priority, it is in each instance merely a matter of
which ontological categories the two compared entities belong to; this has
the consequence that entities that belong to the same ontological category
will be equals in the ontological ranking. Thus, what is in fact ranked
according to relation 2 of ontological priority are not individual entities,
but categories of them; or in other words, individual entities are ranked
merely qua representatives of ontological categories.
I will restrict my attention to the second relation of ontological priority
because only the second relation really deserves being called a “relation
of ontological priority”. For the first relation, the designation “inverse of
the relation of unilateral ontic dependence”1 would be more appropriate,
since that relation, in contrast to the other one under consideration, pre-
supposes no comprehensive categorial system of entities. To provide such
a system is the main theoretical aim of ontology, and only such a relation
should, properly speaking, include the epithet “ontological” in its name
that intrinsically refers to the theoretical aims of ontology. In addition,
ontological priority has certainly been understood, and still is understood,
more frequently in the sense of relation 2 than in the sense of relation 1;
thus, established ontological usage also justifies the choice I have made
among the two relations.
Before I continue with the explication of ontological priority in the
sense of relation 2, let me briefly comment upon how ontological priority
(in the sense now chosen) is related to unilateral ontic dependence (or its
inverse). Both relations are in fact independent of each other. Even without
further explications, it is clear that an entity may unilaterally ontically
depend on an entity , although is not ontologically prior to . If
and belong to the same ontological category, then is not ontologically
prior, but ontologically equal to ; nevertheless, it may well be that
is unilaterally ontically dependent upon , that it cannot exist without ,
although can exist without . A hemisphere of a sphere made of metal is
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not ontologically prior to the sphere, but the sphere is unilaterally ontically
dependent on this hemisphere. Conversely, can be ontologically prior to
, although is not unilaterally ontically dependent on . If the existence
of has nothing to do with the existence of , but the category of is
prior to the category of , then we have precisely the situation which has
just been described as possible. And, indeed, it is not implausible that I
am ontologically prior to the property of being made of gold, although
the property of being made of gold is certainly not unilaterally ontically
dependent on me.
The first postulate we ought to put down for the relation of ontological
priority now under consideration is obviously the following:
is ontologically prior to iff the category of is ontologi-
cally prior to the category of .
(P1)
The relation of ontological priority between entities is defined by the rela-
tion of ontological priority between categories, and we now have to turn to
the analysis of the latter relation.
(P1) presupposes that there is one and only one ontological category for
each entity : the category of . This seems problematic; might there not
be entities that belong to no category or to several categories at once? In
speaking of ontological categories we have to refer to a certain system of
them, for of course there are infinitely many ways of exhaustively dividing
up all entities into disjoint classes, most of them entirely uninteresting.
A system of ontological categories should be fruitful for the formulation
of ontological theories (and ideally, of course, it should be fruitful also
for the formulation of other, non-ontological theories); it should, in short,
be ontologically significant. Suppose we are in the possession of such a
system; perhaps it is even the best system we can find; let us call it OS.
Then each entity falls under at most one category in OS, since its categories
logically exclude each other; that is simply the way each and every system
of ontological categories is to be constructed. But it may easily happen –
indeed, precisely because OS is supposed to be ontologically significant –
that there is some entity that does not fall under any category in OS. It is
really very difficult to capture everything in a truly significant system. But
we can forestall the possibility just mentioned by adding to all the proper
categories in OS one improper category which is destined to receive all
entities that cannot be alloted to any of the proper categories in OS; ideally,
of course, the improper category will remain empty. By this simple trick
we can guarantee that OS exhausts ontological space, and, referring to OS,
we now can indeed assert that there is one and only one category for each
entity.
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For the time being, we may leave it open whether OS contains finitely
many or infinitely many categories, whether those categories are non-empty
or not. I will assume in what follows that this or that ontological concept
is a category in OS; I will assume this first of all for the category of
individuals. This category is surely non-empty. But if the category of indi-
viduals were the only non-empty category in OS – this is the position that
a strict nominalist would defend – then the relation of ontological priority
between entities would be empty. For take any two entities and . Under
the supposition that the only non-empty category in OS is the category
of individuals, both and must be individuals, since OS exhausts all
entities; and hence the category of is the category of . But then
is not ontologically prior to , because no category is ontologically prior
to itself. Rather, is ontologically equal to , because every category
is ontologically equal to itself. Consider that we have as a counterpart of
(P1):
is ontologically equal to iff the category of is ontologi-
cally equal to the category of .
(P2)
Moreover, if the category of individuals were the only non-empty one
in OS, ontological priority between categories would become an empty
relation too; for it seems reasonable to hold that category being onto-
logically prior to category requires the non-emptiness both of and
of . Thus, considerations of ontological priority, whether with respect
to entities or to categories, are of interest only if there is at least one other
category in OS which is non-empty.
Strict nominalism is a position seldom defended. Much more frequently
one finds a position that may be termed “set-theoretical nominalism”. Set-
theoretical nominalists (for example, Quine and David Lewis) hold that in
addition to individuals there are all the sets in the hierarchy of sets that
has the sets of individuals as its basis – and that there is nothing else. But
one need not be a set-theoretical nominalist in order to hold that besides
individuals there are at least sets of them – a position most ontologists
would agree with. In recognition of this, let OS provisionally comprise,
besides the non-empty category of individuals, the non-empty category of
sets of individuals.
It seems evident that the category of individuals is ontologically prior
to the category of sets of individuals. But it is not at all clear what is the
content of this claim. It is, of course, very plausible to hold that individ-
uals are epistemologically prior to sets of individuals. But we are here
concerned with ontological, not with epistemological priority. Could it
be that the obviousness of the ontological priority of individuals to sets
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of them is simply due to a confusion of ontological with epistemological
priority? Could it be, indeed, that we really do not have any clear idea what
ontological priority, in this particular case and in general, amounts to?
Let me consider two arguments that aim to establish the ontological
priority of individuals to sets of individuals:
(1) Sets are abstract entities, individuals are not. Therefore: individuals
are ontologically prior to sets of individuals.
The first thing to be said about this is that the second premise “indi-
viduals are not abstract entities” is rather doubtful. Are there not abstract
individuals? Well, perhaps there is a sense of “abstract” in which there
are indeed no abstract individuals. Note that this sense of “abstract” must
be a purely ontological sense, since what we are aiming at is ontological
priority; a purely ontological sense of “abstract” is, however, not at all
obvious, at least to my mind. The negation of “abstract” is “concrete”, and
the ordinary meaning of the latter term (hence also the ordinary meaning
of the former) seems to involve an essential reference to us and our cog-
nitive faculties: concreteness is an aspect of experience. Can anything be
legitimately called “abstract” in a sense that leaves this ordinary meaning
out of consideration?
A purely ontological definition of “abstract” might seem to be available
by defining: is abstract := is not a spatio-temporally located. But aside
from the fact that this definition provides on the one hand no intrinsic
reason for assuming that there are no abstract individuals, and makes it on
the other hand doubtful whether sets of individuals are generally abstract
(why not say that is precisely where spatio-temporal individual is,
and that it exists precisely as long?), the proffered definition is heavily
dependent on questionable epistemological considerations: by presuppos-
ing that the spatio-temporally located entities are precisely those which
are, in principle, empirically accessible to us. Suppose it turned out that
some entity is not spatio-temporally located, but nevertheless empirically
accessible to us (this is what an impressive number of mystics is telling us).
We would not react to this by applying the above definition, saying “well,
some abstract entity has turned out to be empirically accessible to us”; we
would not react in this way, because an entity that is empirically accessible
to us simply cannot be an abstract entity. This shows that there are pos-
sible circumstances where the above definition yields grossly inadequate
results (and would be discarded), and hence it constitutes an inadequate
explication of “abstract”.
It is of no help to offer an enumerative definition: abstract entities are
sets, properties, relations, propositions . . . , etc., for such a definition offers
no reason at all why non-abstract entities should be ontologically prior to
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abstract ones. And this seems to be the problem with every purely onto-
logical sense of the word “abstract” (if there be such senses) which is such
that all sets and no individuals are abstract. Why should this be a reason for
holding that individuals are ontologically prior to sets of individuals? Why
should non-abstract entities be ontologically prior to abstract ones? We
cannot answer: because non-abstract entities are epistemically more ac-
cessible to us than abstract entities. And a truly ontological answer seems
not to be available either.
(2) The category of sets of individuals is functionally dependent on the
category of individuals: the former category is a category under which all
entities are entities of (functionally dependent on) entities in the latter cate-
gory; every set of individuals is a set of individuals. Therefore: individuals
are ontologically prior to sets of individuals.
But why should the fact that all sets of individuals are entities of indi-
viduals make individuals ontologically prior to sets of them? After all, the
fact that every father is the father of a child (hence functionally dependent
on a child) does not make children ontologically prior to fathers.
If we want to uphold the ontological priority of individuals to sets of
individuals, then we have to look for better arguments than (1) and (2).
More importantly, we first have to establish an adequate sense in which
one category of entities can be ontologically prior to another. The best way
to a definition of ontological priority, it seems to me, is to make use of
either of two central ontological concepts: identity and actual existence.
Then we can define (for non-empty categories and in OS):
is ontologically prior to iff the identity of the entities




is ontologically prior to iff the actual existence of the
entities under is reducible to the actual existence of entities
under , but not vice versa.
(D2)
To these two alternative definitions of ontological priority there correspond
two alternative definitions of ontological equality: (D1 ) and (D2 ). Simply
replace in (D1) and (D2) “ is ontologically prior to ” by “ is ontolog-
ically equal to ”, and the clause “but not vice versa” by the clause “and
vice versa”. (Note that the concepts of reducibility here invoked are not
asymmetric; this is contrary to some accepted usages of the predicate “is
reducible to”, but not to all; for example: functions are said to be reducible
to sets; but sets are also said to be reducible to functions, and these two
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claims are certainly not understood in such a way as to contradict each
other.)
But having come thus far, a surprise is waiting for us: individuals and
sets of individuals turn out to be ontologically equal, no matter whether
we choose (D1 ) or (D2 ). The identity of sets of individuals is reducible
to the identity of individuals, since sets of individuals are identical if and
only if their elements are identical. But the identity of individuals is also
reducible to the identity of sets of them, since individuals are identical if
and only if they are elements of identical sets of individuals. Moreover, the
actual existence of sets of individuals is reducible to the actual existence of
individuals, since a set of individuals actually exists if and only if it is non-
empty and all its elements actually exist. But again the actual existence of
individuals is also reducible to the actual existence of sets of them, since
an individual actually exists if and only if it is an element of an actually
existing set of individuals.
Somebody may object: we do not understand the identity of sets of in-
dividuals unless we have previously understood the identity of individuals,
whereas we do not need to understand the identity of sets of individuals
before understanding the identity of individuals. Therefore individuals are
prior to sets of individuals.
But the objector is obviously referring to epistemic considerations –
considerations that have to do very directly with us and our cognitive fac-
ulties – while all we are concerned with here is ontological priority. That
individuals are epistemologically prior to sets of individuals is uncontro-
versial, but not our concern.
Suppose now that we adhere to an intensionalistic position in ontol-
ogy and that we have among the non-empty categories of OS besides the
category of individuals the category of properties of individuals, which
replaces the category of sets of individuals.2 Nevertheless, the above con-
siderations involving sets of individuals can almost be repeated verbatim.
Prima facie, individuals are ontologically prior to their properties. This is
what we all have learned from Aristotle. But on closer inspection the Aris-
totelian thesis turns out to be indefensible (at least according to our present
lights). The arguments (1) and (2) above fail for properties of individuals
as much as they fail for sets of them. And if we apply definition (D2 ),
then individuals and properties of individuals are found to be ontologically
equal: The actual existence of properties of individuals can be reduced
to the actual existence of individuals, since properties of individuals are
actually existent if and only if they are exemplified, and exemplified by
actually existent individuals only. And vice versa: the actual existence of
individuals can be reduced to the actual existence of properties of indi-
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viduals, since an individual actually exists if and only if it exemplifies an
actually existent property of individuals.
But note that we are here modelling the actual existence of properties
on the basis of the received conception of the actual existence of sets: the
actual existence of a set requires that all its elements actually exist, and
hence by analogy: the actual existence of a property is taken to require that
all its instances actually exist. But alternatively we could merely require
for the actual existence of a property that at least one of its instances actu-
ally exists. If we choose this alternative weaker requirement, then, indeed,
the actual existence of individuals can no longer be reduced to the actual
existence of properties of individuals, since then an individual that does not
actually exist might nevertheless exemplify an actually existing property. I
will come back to this after formulating a general reducibility principle for
actual existence near the end of the paper.
According to (D1), properties of individuals could even be considered
to be ontologically prior to individuals (Plato would certainly be pleased
about this): The identity of individuals is reducible to the identity of prop-
erties of individuals, since individuals are identical if and only if they
exemplify identical properties of individuals. This is what the old Leibniz-
Principle says (which, in order to be useful for the present reduction, may
be taken to refer to all properties of individuals, non-relational and rela-
tional ones, excepting the properties of being identical with this or that
individual). But it is not so clear that the identity of properties of indi-
viduals is conversely reducible to the identity of individuals. We have the
well-known examples of properties of individuals which are exemplified
by the very same individuals, but which are nevertheless non-identical.
However, the identity of properties of individuals is not reducible to the
identity of individuals because properties of individuals are identical if
and only if they are exemplified by the same individuals, but rather because
such properties are identical if and only if it is necessarily the case that they
are exemplified by the same individuals. Yet, are there not also examples
of properties of individuals for which it is necessarily the case that they
are exemplified by the same individuals, but which are non-identical nev-
ertheless? What about the property of being an equilateral triangle and the
property of being an equiangular one? They certainly seem to be two prop-
erties. And if they are, what does then become of the converse reducibility
of the identity of properties of individuals to the identity of individuals?
According to the coarsegrained conception of properties, necessary co-
extension is indeed generally sufficient for property-identity; but according
to the finegrained conception of properties, it is not. Thus, in view of the
above considerations and applying definitions (D1) and (D1 ): properties of
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individuals are ontologically equal to individuals in case the coarsegrained
conception of properties is assumed; but if the finegrained conception of
properties is presupposed, then properties of individuals are in fact on-
tologically prior to individuals.3 In both cases the traditional ontological
order is not confirmed. Nor is it unequivocally confirmed, as we have seen,
if we use definitions (D2) and (D2 ).
Is there a category in OS which is ontologically prior both to the cate-
gory of individuals and to the category of properties of individuals? Given
that there are other categories in OS than the two we have just discussed,
it is by no means guaranteed that those other categories must either be
ontologically prior or posterior to, say, the category of individuals, or on-
tologically equal to it. The relations of ontological priority and equality –
whether defined by (D1) and (D1 ), or by (D2) and (D2 ) – do not necessar-
ily induce a complete quasi-ordering on OS. In fact, the definitions alone
merely guarantee that the relation of ontological priority is asymmetrical
(hence irreflexive), that the relation of ontological equality is symmetrical,
and that ontological priority excludes ontological equality. Everything else
depends on how the reducibility of -identity to -identity, or of actual
-existence to actual -existence, is interpreted. Indeed, there may not
be a global interpretation, and we may have to decide for each pair of cate-
gories what is to be meant in their particular case by the invoked relation of
reducibility (of identity or of actual existence). In any case, we should aim
at least at obtaining the following principle for the reducibility of identity
(and the analogue of it for the reducibility of actual existence):
Reflexivity and Transitivity
For all categories , and in OS: -identity is reducible to -
identity, and if -identity is reducible to -identity, and -identity to
-identity, then -identity is reducible to -identity.
But suppose, getting more deeply involved in intensionalism, that OS
contains the non-empty category of states of affairs besides the category of
individuals and the category of properties of individuals. Just as for prop-
erties, one can distinguish a coarsegrained and a finegrained conception of
states of affairs. Let us decide, both for properties and for states of affairs,
in favor of a coarsegrained conception. This has the consequence we have
already seen: that individuals and properties of individuals turn out to be
ontologically equal – even according to (D1 ). For states of affairs, choos-
ing the coarsegrained conception of them has the immediate consequence
that states of affairs are identical if they necessarily co-obtain; given the
coarsegrained conception of states of affairs, it is a generally sufficient
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condition for the identity of states of affairs that they cannot obtain without
each other; it would not have been a generally sufficient condition if we had
chosen the finegrained conception.
Now, what is the position of (coarsegrained) states of affairs in the or-
der of ontological priority with respect to individuals and (coarsegrained)
properties of individuals? If we proceed on the basis of definition (D2),
then it is seen that states of affairs are ontologically prior to individuals:
the actual existence of individuals is reducible to the actual existence of
states of affairs, since an individual actually exists if and only if the state
of affairs that actually exists actually exists, or in other words: obtains.
But the actual existence of states of affairs is apparently not reducible to
the actual existence of individuals. There are states of affairs whose actual
existence is quite independent of the actual existence of individuals (for
example, the state of affairs that or not , for any ). And even if there
were no actually existing individuals at all, there certainly would still be
obtaining states of affairs, even non-tautological ones. Indeed, the state of
affairs that there are no actually existing individuals would be an example
of a state of affairs not merely actually existing (or obtaining) in spite of
the supposed counterfactual situation, but because of it.
Given (D2), arguments which are completely analogous to those I have
just brought forward show that states of affairs are also ontologically prior
to properties of individuals. Thus, on the basis of (D2), states of affairs are
ontologically prior both to individuals and to properties of individuals.
But what if we proceed on the basis of (D1)? We find that the identity of
individuals is reducible to the identity of states of affairs, since individuals,
and , are identical if and only if, for every property of individuals , the
concatenation of with is identical to the concatenation of with .
(The concatenation of a property of individuals with an individual is a state
of affairs.4) We also find that the identity of properties of individuals is re-
ducible to the identity of states of affairs, since properties of individuals,
and , are identical if and only if, for every individual , the concatenation
of with is identical to the concatenation of with . It is not apparent
that the identity of states of affairs is conversely reducible either to the
identity of individuals or to the identity of properties of individuals. But
this needs closer inspection.
For there is indeed a way of reducing the identity of states of affairs
to the identity of properties of individuals, but it is a way that does not
strike one as being particularly natural. If we have an appropriately wide
conception of properties of individuals, then there is for each state of affairs
a certain property of individuals such that the concatenation of with
any individual is . Availing ourselves of an operator of (functional)
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abstraction , we have: For every state of affairs and every individual :
the concatenation of ( & that( )) with is . (Note that “&” is
here connecting singular terms for states of affairs – “ ” and “that(
)” – to form a further singular term, it is not connecting sentences to form
a further sentence.) ( & that( )) may be called “the property of
individuals corresponding to ”. The identity of states of affairs can now
be seen to be reducible to the identity of properties of individuals, since
states of affairs are identical if and only if the properties of individuals
corresponding to them are identical. Therefore, if we accept properties of
individuals that correspond as indicated to states of affairs and interpret
ontological equality on the basis of definition (D1 ), then states of affairs
and properties of individuals are seen to be ontologically equal.
But on the basis of (D1 ) there seems to be prima facie no way to
reach the ontological equality of individuals and states of affairs. Nev-
ertheless there is such a way: states of affairs are identical if and only if
the properties of individuals corresponding to them are identical, and these
properties, in turn, are identical if and only if it is necessarily the case
that they are exemplified by identical individuals. Thus states of affairs
are identical if and only if the properties of individuals corresponding to
them are, as a matter of necessity, exemplified by the same individuals,
and therefore the identity of states of affairs is (indirectly) reducible to
the identity of individuals. Since we have already seen that the identity
of individuals is also reducible to the identity of states of affairs, we thus
have, on the basis of (D1 ), the ontological equality of states of affairs to
individuals.
Let me sum up the results reached so far ( , and represent in an
obvious manner the categories considered):
On the basis of (D1), (D1 ):
the 1-row
On the basis of (D2), (D2 ):
the 2-row
Both rows are in conformity with the formal properties of a quasi-ordering,
but they do not agree with each other. At first sight it seems that the prop-
erty of individuals & that( )) – the property of individuals
corresponding to state of affairs – could be used even on the basis of
(D2 ) to obtain the ontological equality of states of affairs and properties
of individuals. The actual existence of states of affairs appears to be re-
ducible to the actual existence of properties of individuals, since a state of
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affairs actually exists (or obtains) if and only if the property of individuals
corresponding to the state of affairs is exemplified. But note that the exem-
plification of a property is not yet the property’s actual existence, although
the actual existence of a property certainly implies that it is exemplified.
We can, therefore, only assert that the actual existence of states of affairs
is reducible to the exemplification of properties of individuals, not that
it is reducible to their actual existence. (Exemplification is not suitable
for the explication of ontological priority and equality, since it is not a
global ontological concept like actual existence or identity: individuals,
for example, cannot be exemplified.)
Nor can & that( )) be used for obtaining on the basis of
(D2 ) the ontological equality of states of affairs and individuals. That a
state of affairs actually exists if and only if the property of individuals
corresponding to it is exemplified by an actually existent individual would
indeed establish the reducibility of the actual existence of states of affairs
onto the actual existence of individuals; but unfortunately it is simply false
that a state of affairs actually exists if and only if the property of individuals
corresponding to it is exemplified by an actually existing individual. (Re-
member that there would be obtaining states of affairs even if there were
no actually existent individuals. Note that the “if and only if” invoked in
assertions that justify reducibility-assertions is not simply material equiva-
lence, but carries the force of conditional necessity. Reducibility-assertions
themselves imply their necessitations, and so do their negations, and hence
also – via (D1), (D2), (D1 ) and (D2 ) – assertions of ontological priority
and equality. It is also a matter of necessity if a category is empty, and also
if it is not.)
The 1-row and the 2-row do not agree, and apparently they cannot be
brought into agreement. Thus the choice between the pair (D1), (D1 ) on
the one hand and the pair (D2), (D2 ) on the other is a truly substantial
choice. But there do not seem to be any clear objective criteria for making
that choice. Yet we have to make a choice, since sound logical methodol-
ogy forbids the double-defining of anything (for good reasons, as we have
seen). Personally, I prefer (D2) and (D2 ) which yield the 2-row. On the
other hand, the concept of actual existence, on which the 2-row is based, is
a much more controversial ontological concept than the concept of identity,
on which the 1-row is based. Therefore, let me very briefly remark how I
conceive of actual existence. In contrast to other concepts of existence, it is
for actual existence not necessarily the case that everything exists, and it is
not the case that everything exists necessarily or necessarily not. Denying
actualism, I would add that some entities do indeed not actually exist.
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No matter whether we proceed on the basis of (D1) and (D1 ) or on
the basis of (D2) and (D2 ), the results reached contradict traditional views
on ontological priority. Those views assume the ontological primacy of
individuals. All other ontological categories are considered to be posterior
to the category of individuals – if indeed those other categories are allowed
to be non-empty. What is the explanation of this preference for individuals
in the history of ontology? My colleague Erwin Tegtmeier has called the
preference “reism” in his book on categorial ontology. So what is the ex-
planation of reism, which in the hands of the nominalists is carried to truly
fanatical extremes? It is not satisfactory to point out that in reism ontolog-
ical priority is being confused with epistemological priority. For there are
fairly obvious considerations which deliver with respect to epistemology
the very same priority and equality results that have been reached with
respect to ontology. Consider ordinary experience. Do we experience pure
properties? No. Pace Plato and what he says about Beauty, we do not even
have any idea of what it would be like to experience a pure property, a prop-
erty by and in itself without any reference to instances it has. Everybody
agrees. But do we experience pure individuals? The answer has to be “No”
again. Pace Plotinus and what he says about the One, we do not even have
any idea of what it would be like to experience a pure individual, an indi-
vidual by and in itself without any reference to properties it exemplifies.
What we do experience are individuals that have or exemplify properties.
But by the same token we should undoubtedly also accept that we do expe-
rience properties that are exemplified by individuals. Thus, in experience,
individuals and properties of individuals are on a par. Indeed, they are in
experience inextricably related to each other as constituents of wholes
which we experience as well as individuals and properties, and which
we may even be said to experience primarily: obtaining states of affairs.
(By the way: that entities under are – asymmetrically – constituents of
entities under cannot be used to establish the ontological priority of
either category: every entity under may need in it constituents from K;
but likewise every entity from may need to be in a whole from .)
The recognition of these elementary truths about experience is blocked
for so many people by the prejudice, thoughtlessly repeated over and over
again, that properties and states of affairs are abstract entities which can-
not be experienced. But to the unprejudiced the analysis of experience
forcefully suggests that individuals, properties of individuals and states of
affairs are epistemologically equal, that states of affairs are perhaps even
epistemologically prior to both individuals and properties of individuals
(the latter two remaining epistemologically equal). These epistemological
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results agree remarkably well with the ontological ones exhibited by the
1-row and the 2-row.
Nevertheless, we certainly find it very hard to give up either the onto-
logical or the epistemological priority of individuals to all other kinds of
entities. There must be some sense, we believe, in which individuals are
both ontologically and epistemologically prior to everthing else, and that
sense, we feel, is bound to be the correct sense. Why do we believe thus?
The reason is not the authority of Aristotle, exerting in an Ockhamistic
transformation a subterranean influence even to this very day. The reason is
simply that we are individuals ourselves, or to put it in a different way: that
individuals are entities more or less like us. This fact makes us look pri-
marily for individuals in cognition, makes us direct our attention primarily
to them, and in this sense individuals are indeed epistemologically prior
to everything else, the above considerations on epistemological priority
notwithstanding. But the fact of being individuals ourselves also makes
us value individuals more than other entities, and this – quite understand-
able – judgment of value exerts a distorting influence on our judgments of
ontological priority.
Racism is the attitude that accords unjustifiable preference to one’s own
race, sexism is the attitude that accords unjustifiable preference to one’s
own sex, and recently we even have learned about speciesism: the unjusti-
fiable preference of one’s own biological species. So I suppose we may add
categorism to the list, which is the attitude that accords unjustifiable pref-
erence to one’s own ontological category. Very many ontologists have been
guilty of categorism: they have accorded unjustifiable preference to their
own ontological category, the category of individuals. But I should hasten
to add that speaking of guilt in this context is really entirely metaphori-
cal. For in contrast to racism, sexism and perhaps even speciesism, there
attaches no moral opprobium to categorism. This is simply due to the fact
that no living being can be hurt by categorism. All living beings are indi-
viduals, no entity that is not an individual is capable of adopting the attitude
of categorism, all individuals that adopt categorism direct it against entities
that are not individuals. So let the radical categorists, alias the nominalists,
scour the world of properties, states of affairs, propositions, etc., they can
do no harm in the name of ontological monism – quite unlike the radical
racists, who can do and have done unspeakable harm in the name of racial
purity. Unlike people, one cannot hurt properties, states of affairs, or any
entity that is not an individual. And therefore categorism is not morally
wrong, it is merely a mistake. Note that a correction of the mistake is not
brought about by basically valuing properties of individuals, for example,
as much as individuals, but by making no comparisons of value between
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individuals and their properties at all. In this, too, categorism differs from
racism and sexism.
Curiously, one might try to exploit the fact that only individuals can
adopt categorism, or that only individuals can be hurt, for claiming gen-
eral ontological priority for their category. For adopting categorism or
being hurt, or more generally: being a conscious entity – properties which
only individuals are capable of having – appear to be superior forms of
existence. Leaving aside the fact that only some individuals have the capa-
bilities for the mentioned superior forms of existence, we may observe that
under every category some entities are capable of something all entities in
other categories are not capable of. Why should the capability of being a
conscious entity, which some individuals and no entities in other categories
have, constitute a ground for their ontological primacy, while the capabil-
ity of being exemplified by individuals only (the capability of to be
exemplified by some individual, it being impossible that it is exemplified
by some non-individual), which some properties of individuals have and no
entities in other categories, does not constitute a ground for the ontological
primacy of properties of individuals? Why indeed? We can recognize a
comparative judgment of value in this asymmetry between individuals and
their properties – a characteristic capability of the former is valued higher
than a characteristic capability of the latter – a judgment of value which
seems to be founded on nothing else but categorism.
Yet, possibly the judgment of value is objectively true. Being a con-
scious entity could very well be an objectively superior form of existence
(it has traditionally been considered to be one), while being exemplified
by some individual, and necessarily not by all non-individuals, may not
be such an objectively superior form of existence. But note that this, while
justifying the attitude implied in our categorism, would be just as irrelevant
for ontological priority as epistemic issues are irrelevant for it. Ontological
priority has nothing to do with judgments of value, not even with those
which are objectively true.
But if valuative considerations are allowed to infiltrate questions of on-
tological priority, then the very incapabilities of properties of individuals
may be used for making them appear ontologically prior to individuals,
contrary to the order of precedence suggested by the argumentation just
given above, which was also value-based, but which, in valuation, adhered
to a quite different point of view. Properties of individuals, in contrast to
individuals, cannot be hurt, they cannot change intrinsically, they cannot
be destroyed. Plato was very much impressed by this, and it led him to
accord a superior status to properties of individuals – a status which in a
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rather confused way was also conceived of as a status of ontological (and
epistemological) primacy.
In closing, let me briefly consider the relation of ontological priority
with respect to an infinite system of ontological categories (including, for
example, all kinds of relations). OS, expanded to an infinite system of
categories, can be inductively defined as follows:
is the category of individuals.(1)
is the category of states of affairs.(2)
If 1, . . . , , are categories, then 1, . . . , is also a
category.
(3)
Proper categories of OS are only concepts that can be generated
according to (1) – (3). In addition there is the improper category
of OS: .
(4)
In order to avoid any ontological or logical problems with categories, it
is convenient to think of them (and of ontological concepts in general) as
linguistic entities: general terms having a certain meaning; what is cate-
gorized by them are, however, entities properly speaking: non-linguistic
entities. Categories having the form 1, . . . , are categories of func-
tions: 1, . . . , is the category of all -adic functions ( 1) that are
defined precisely for arguments from the categories 1 to (in that order)
and whose values are entities from the category . Categories having the
form are categories of properties, , for example, is the category
of properties of individuals: they are functions that take individuals into
states of affairs. Categories having the form 1, . . . , , with 2 , are
categories of relations: , for example, is the category of dyadic rela-
tions of individuals. Like properties, relations are functions whose values
are states of affairs.
We can then inductively reduce the actual existence of the entities under
every functional category to the actual existence of the entities under its
constituent categories, and ultimately, of course, to the actual existence
of individuals and of states of affairs. Consider X, which falls under the
functional category 1, . . . , :
Reducibility-Principle for Actual Existence
actually exists iff there are actually existing entities 1 such
that 1 falls under the category 1 under the category , and
such that 1 [which falls under the category D] actually exists.
( 1 is the concatenation of with 1 , or in Fregean
terms: the saturation of by 1 .)
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Given this transitive way of reducing the actual existence of entities
under a functional category to the actual existence of entities under its
constituent-categories, which have lower functional degree, we still do not
have the ontological priority of the latter categories to the former, since we
must in each case exclude the converse reducibility: a difficult problem,
if it is to be solved in an entirely general manner, and it cannot be solved
completely in a piecemeal fashion, since OS is now supposed to contain
infinitely many categories. Remember also that the ontological priority
of one category to another requires the non-emptiness of both categories;
this leaves us with the problem of deciding which of the infinitely many
categories in OS are non-empty.
If we stick with the most elementary categories in OS, with , , and
, or: individuals, states of affairs, and properties of individuals ( )
– supposing them to be non-empty – then we are pointed by the above
reducibility-principle to yet another row of ontological priority: because
individuals and properties of individuals can now be hardly considered to
be ontologically equal to each other. The actual existence of properties of
individuals is reducible, according to that reducibility-principle, to the
actual existence of individuals in combination with the actual existence
of states of affairs: actually exists if and only if there is an actually
existing individual such that [the concatenation of with , which
is a state of affairs] actually exists.5 But how could we now conversely
reduce the actual existence of individuals to that of properties of individu-
als (perhaps in combination with the actual existence of states of affairs)?
There is apparently no way to obtain this converse reduction. The previous
results concerning the ontological priority of states of affairs to properties
of individuals and to individuals remain valid,6 and thus we have:
the 3-row
which is a row of ontological priority incompatible with both the 1- and
the 2-row presented above, but which is surely no less justified than they
are. Judgments of ontological priority, even if we keep them clear of mat-
ters which are foreign to them (namely, epistemic and valuative matters),
unavoidably depend on our theoretical decisions, with respect to which we
are not in a position to establish whether they are objectively correct or
not. Thus, in a rather indirect but nevertheless essential manner, ontolog-
ical priority is dependent on us, since the very concept is to some degree
the product of our own choices. Perhaps the considerations in this paper
even suggest that our decisions (or conventions) are to such a high degree
involved in determining the concept of ontological priority that the conclu-
sion becomes unavoidable that there is no sufficiently objective concept of
ontological priority at all.
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NOTES
1 For an extended discussion of ontic dependence (under the name of “ontological depen-
dence”) see chapter 8 of Simons’ Parts.
2 In intensional ontology, sets are treated as properties, sets of individuals, in particular,
as properties of individuals. See the relevant chapters in my Axiomatic Formal Ontology.
3 One can also argue that properties of individuals are epistemologically prior to indi-
viduals, since we can determine the identity of individuals only through determining the
identity of their properties, while the latter determining can apparently be done directly by
us. But from a different angle, individuals, to the contrary, seem to be epistemologically
prior to their properties, since we can determine the actual existence of a property of
individuals only through determining the actual existence of the individuals that exemplify
that property, which determination apparently can be arrived at directly by us.
4 The ontology of concatenation (or saturation) is treated exhaustively in Axiomatic For-
mal Ontology.
5 being a state of affairs, “ actually exists (obtains)” is tantamount to “ is an
instance of ” or “ exemplifies ”.
6 We can give a new twist to the ontological priority of states of affairs to individuals
by making use of the property of actual existence for individuals (which is a property
of individuals): The actual existence of individuals is reducible to the actual existence of
states of affairs, since an individual actually exists if and only if the concatenation of
the property of actual existence for individuals with (which concatenation is a state of
affairs) actually exists.
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